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Abstract
In the run-up to Paris, individual countries and multilateral banks made new promises
to provide millions of dollars for adaptation (and mitigation) action in developing countries,
with a view to reaching the usd 100 billion target announced in Copenhagen and confirmed
in Paris. But where are all these funds going to? To what extent do they reach the poorest
and most vulnerable, those most in need of support?
The focus of this paper is on bilateral aid for adaptation to climate change. Using oecd
data on adaptation aid, we examine how donors allocate this aid—and to what extent they
indeed prioritise those ‘particularly’ vulnerable to climate change. To understand donor be-
haviour, we build on the large literature on aid allocation in general, and on adaptation aid in
particular. Yet, as opposed to traditional dyadic analyses, we conceptualise aid allocation as
a network, in which the provision of adaptation aid is a network tie. This network approach,
we argue, is better able to capture interactions between donors, for the allocation decisions of
others likely influence a donor’s allocation decision. Donors on the one hand coordinate their
allocation, but on the other hand also compete for political and economic influence through
the provision of aid, including aid for adaptation. In order to capture these coordination
dynamics in addition to the dyadic relationships between donors and recipients we employ
Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models.
Our analysis indicates that donors consider recipient need and recipient merit when de-
ciding on how to allocate adaptation aid: more vulnerable and more democratic countries are
more likely to receive adapation aid. More importantly, however, donors consider their own
economic and political interests: trading partners and former colonies are much more likely to
receive adaptation aid. Finally, we also find evidence for donor coordination: countries that
already receive adaptation aid from other countries are less likely to form additional ties, that
is, they are less likely to also receive adaptation aid from additional donors.
1 Introduction
More and more aid is earmarked for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Notably since the
Copenhagen pledge of ‘mobilizing jointly usd 100 billion dollars a year by 2020’ (unfccc 2009:
article 8)—a goal that was confirmed in the Paris Agreement—donors have provided increasing
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levels of climate-related aid. We here focus on adaptation, where public funding in the form of
aid is of particular importance, and specifically examine the allocation of bilateral adaptation
aid: how do donors distribute their adaptation aid among recipient countries?
There is a consensus that adaptation aid should prioritise developing countries that are ‘par-
ticularly vulnerable’ to the adverse effects of climate change. Already the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) stipulates that developed countries ‘assist
the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change’ (unfccc 1992: article 4(4)). Later agreements confirmed the focus on vulnerable coun-
tries; most recently, the Paris Agreement recognises the importance of developed country support
for adaptation, and again highlights the specific needs of particularly vulnerable countries (UN-
FCCC 2015).
While we would therefore expect vulnerable countries receive relatively more adaptation aid, other
factors likely also play a role. For general development aid, research has since the 1970s found
that beyond recipient need, donors also take into account recipient merit and donor interests
when allocating aid: Donors do not only altruistically assist countries most in need of support,
but use development aid to reward certain recipient characteristics like good governance as well
as to further their own economic, political and security interests (e.g. Clist 2011; McKinley 1978;
McKinley and Little 1977; 1979; Neumayer 2003; Zanger 2000). Finally, donors likely consider
the allocation decisions of other donors in their own allocation decisions. Aid flows from other
donors serve as signals on the trustworthiness and efficiency of a recipient—hence the existence
of ‘aid orphans’ and ‘aid darlings’. At the same time, there is increasingly a push toward more
donor coordination to increase aid effectiveness (see OECD 2008).
While we have thus strong reasons to believe that donors influence each other in their allocation
decisions, ‘the interaction between members of the donor community has been little studied’ (Frot
and Santiso 2011: 57; see also e.g. Klasen and Davies 2011). We address this gap in the literature
and explicitly examine donor interactions by conceptualising aid allocation as a network, in which
the provision of adaptation aid is a network tie. Through this network approach we are able to
capture both ‘traditional’ determinants of allocation—recipient need, recipient merit and donor
interests—and interaction effects between donors, and hence obtain a fuller picture of allocation
patterns than we would with dyadic regression analysis.
2 Literature Review and Expectations
How donors distribute their development aid among recipients has received considerable academic
attention. McKinley and Little (1977; 1979) and McKinley (1978) were the first to distinguish
between two donor motives: recipient need and donor interest. Subsequent studies built on
and extended this model by adding recipient merit as a third donor motive for allocating aid
(e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Burns 2000; Clist 2011; Zanger 2000). Most studies find evidence
for different motives, although donor interest—political, economic and security interests of the
donor(s)—tend to dominate and can much better explain allocation patterns than either recipient
2
need or recipient merit (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthe´lemy 2006; Hoeﬄer and Outram
2011).
Studies that focus on ‘green’ aid, that is, aid with an explicit environmental dimension, find
similar results: donors have different motives in allocating (green) aid, though donor interest
often plays a stronger role than recipient need or recipient merit (Figaj 2010; Halimanjaya 2015;
Hicks et al. 2008; Miller 2014).
Most recently, several studies specifically examined the allocation of aid for adaptation to climate
change. A few studies focus on normative assessment of how adaptation aid should be allocated,
and argue for a focus on vulnerable countries (e.g. Duus-Otterstro¨m 2015; Grasso 2010a;b)—
though admitting to the difficulties of identifying which countries are vulnerable (Klein 2009).
Only a few studies empirically examined the distribution of adaptation aid, for individual donors
like Germany (Betzold 2015) or the multilateral Adaptation Fund (Persson and Remling 2014;
Remling and Persson 2015; Stadelmann et al. 2014); for a subset of recipients such as sub-
Saharan Africa (Robertsen et al. 2015) or small island developing states (Robinson and Dornan
2015); for distribution at the sub-national level within a recipient country (Barrett 2014); and
for aggregate aid flows across all donors (Betzold and Weiler 2016). These empirical studies find
limited evidence that vulnerable countries receive more support for adaptation. While vulnerable
countries—measured by different vulnerability indicators—receive more adaptation aid on an
aggregate level (Betzold and Weiler 2016), overall, recipient merit and donor interest seem better
able to explain allocation patterns of adaptation aid.
These studies have neither examined dyadic data for all oecd donors and all recipients, nor have
they considered network effects. This paper thus goes beyond current research by modeling the
allocation of adaptation aid as a network between all oecd donors and all potential recipients.
In line with both the literature on general development aid and the more recent literature on
‘green’ and adaptation aid, we expect the ‘traditional’ determinants of aid allocation—recipient
need, recipient merit and donor interests—to influence how donors distribute their aid for adap-
tation to climate change. Our first three expectations reflect this framework. Additionally, we
add two specific network expectations.
Adaptation aid reportedly aims at assisting developing countries in coping with and adjusting
to the adverse effects of climate change. Recipient need, in an adaptation context, therefore
translates as vulnerability to climate change. The more vulnerable a country to the adverse
effects of climate change, the more in need of external support to deal with these effects it is, and
so donors should be more likely to provide adaptation aid to this country:
H1 The more vulnerable a recipient country to the adverse effects of climate change, the more
likely it will receive adaptation aid.
Burns (2000) introduced the argument that aid is more effective in countries with ‘good’, that is
democratic, polities and ‘good’ economic and fiscal policies. By rewarding ‘good governance’ in
recipient countries, donors could thus increase the effectiveness of their aid (see also e.g. Zanger
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2000). Good governance should also matter for adaptation aid, since adaptation aid is likely to
yield better results where good (environmental) policies are already in place, and can be used to
reward such policies.
H2 The better the (environmental) governance of a recipient country, the more likely it will
receive adaptation aid.
Our third expectation concerns donor interests. As opposed to the first two expectations, which
relate to recipient characteristics, donor interests are specific to the donor–recipient pair. Donors
use their aid to further their own political, economic and security interests, by providing support to
their political friends, trade partners or military allies (e.g. Hoeﬄer and Outram 2011; Neumayer
2003). This applies in particular to bilateral aid; as Berthe´lemy (2006: 88) writes, ‘bilateral aid
motives are, to a large extent, egoistic rather than altruistic’.
‘Green’ aid and adaptation aid is no exception: donors also use their environmental aid to further
their own interests (e.g. Barrett 2014; Betzold 2015; Hicks et al. 2008), as our third expectation
reflects:
H3 The more important a recipient country to a donor—economically or politically—the more
likely it will receive adaptation aid from this donor.
Finally, we also have two (opposing) expectations concerning the network of donors. We believe
that donors do not take their allocation decisions independently of the decisions of other donors,
though these interactions between donors have rarely been studied: ‘there exists remarkably little
analysis on how in actual fact aid allocation to particular countries is affected by aid flows from
other donors’ (Klasen and Davies 2011: 5; see also Davies and Klasen 2013; Frot and Santiso
2011).
So how do aid flows from other donors affect the allocation decision of a donor? On the one hand,
we expect a negative relationship between a recipient’s in-degree and the likelihood of new ties:
the higher the number of donors providing adaptation aid to a recipient country R, the lower
the likelihood of an additional donor to also provide adaptation aid to R, for different theoretical
reasons.
First, donors should have an interest in collectively maximising the impact of their aid. The
tendency of donors to provide aid ‘to all sectors in all countries’ causes severe administrative
costs (Easterly 2007: 639f). According to Bigsten and Tengstam (2015), the average donor
has over 100 partner countries and regions; by focusing on fewer countries, donors could realise
significant cost savings and efficiency gains (see also Nunnenkamp et al. 2013). Accordingly, in the
2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and follow-up agreements, donors agreed on greater
donor coordination to improve aid efficiency and aid effectiveness, and committed to eliminating
duplication of efforts and concentrating their aid on fewer countries (OECD 2008).
Similarly, if aid is about gaining political influence in the recipient country, and if donors want
to maximise their influence, then it may make sense to focus aid on those countries where other
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donors are not active. According to this logic, if recipient R already obtains aid from donor A,
donor B has to compete with A for influence in country R; instead, B may simply to turn to
recipient S, where A is not active, and where B’s aid will hence have a greater impact (cf. Bunte
and Kinne 2015).
Finally, Chong and Gradstein (2008) put forward a ‘freerider hypothesis’: If aid is about relieving
recipients’ need—be that poverty or vulnerability to climate change, donors can free-ride on the
efforts of others. Accordingly, their study finds that each donor provides less aid as the number
of donors increases.
In line with these theoretical considerations, our first network hypothesis expects a negative
relationship of a country’s in-degree and its likelihood of receiving additional adaptation aid:
H4 As a recipient country’s in-degree increases, its probability of receiving additional adaptation
aid decreases.
In practice, however, we see much rhetoric but few deeds; aid fragmentation persists (e.g. Olivie´
and Pe´rez 2016: 52; Aldasoro et al. 2010), and may even have increased since the Paris Declara-
tion Nunnenkamp et al. (2013).1 Donors tend to herd (Frot and Santiso 2011): they provide aid to
those countries which already receive aid from other donors (e.g. Barthel; Dreher and Michaelowa
2010). The opposite seems also true; accordingly, we have so-called ‘aid darlings’ and ‘aid or-
phans’: countries that receive fairly high—or fairly low—levels of support across donors.
Donors take into account the behaviour of other donors, and a donor’s giving aid to a specific
recipient provides important information about that recipient to other donors, including the
recipient’s absorptive capacity or its political or economic relevance. Donor A’s provision of aid
to recipient R signals to donor B that recipient R seems trustworthy and capable of using the
provided aid efficiently and effectively, or that recipient R is an important political or economic
player for A (see Barthel; Olivie´ and Pe´rez 2016). This should make donor B more inclined to
also provide aid to R. The opposite also applies: If donor A does not provide aid to recipient R,
donor B should also be reluctant to become active in recipient R .
In the case of adaptation aid, if recipient R receives adaptation aid from donor A, R’s adaptation
‘readiness’ is presumably high, for instance because it has already made national adaptation
plans and strategies, and can thus directly implement adaptation actions. Accordingly, our
second network hypothesis expects a positive relationship between a country’s in-degree and its
likelihood of receiving additional adaptation aid:
H5 As a recipient country’s in-degree increases, its probability of receiving additional adaptation
aid increases.
1In contrast, Davies and Klasen (2013) find a positive time trend, indicating growing aid coordination and
specialisation.
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3 Data and Methods
Our basic dependent variable consists of five annual network capturing donor–recipient relation-
ships in the period 2010 through 2015. In other words, for each of the five years we have a network
Y for which the individual dyads Yij take on the value 1 when government i made adaptation aid
available to country j, and zero otherwise. Thus, we have five dichotomous networks for the years
2010 through 2014. The data used to code the networks come from the Organisation of Economic
Cooperation and Development Creditor Reporting System (oecd crs). The oecd introduced
a ‘Rio marker for adaptation’ in 2010, according to which any activity should be classified as
related to adaptation if ‘it intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to
the impacts of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive
capacity and resilience’ (oecd 2011: 4). Consequently, if in the crs a country reports to have
provided adaptation aid to a recipient country in a given year, this is recorded in the respective
network as a tie.
The data structure we have is problematic from a statistical point of view, since the different
networks for the various years are very likely not independent of each other, as are the dyads (see
hypotheses 4 and 5, which expect the allocation decisions of donors to depend on the decisions
of others). One way to model such a data structure are Temporal Exponential Random Graph
Models (tergm), which can capture both the network dynamic in a given year and cross-temporal
correlations.
How do we measure our independent variables? Recipient need, in the case of adaptation aid,
refers to vulnerability to climate change. Vulnerability is a contested concept with no single
definition, though most scholars agree that vulnerability has two dimensions: physical exposure
and sensitivity to natural hazard on the one hand, and adaptive capacity on the other (e.g.
Barnett et al. 2008; Smit and Wandel 2006). To capture these two dimensions of vulnerability,
we use three different indicators.
First, we use the environmental vulnerability index, evi. The Secretariat of the Pacific Commu-
nity’s Applied Geoscience and Technology Division (sopac) produced the evi in 2004 to ‘esti-
mat[e] the vulnerability of the environment of a country to future shocks’ (SOPAC 2004). We
focus on the evi Climate Change Subindex, an average of thirteen climate-related geo-physical
indicators such as precipitation patterns. It is time-invariant and ranges from 1 to 7, where higher
scores indicate higher vulnerability (for a detailed description, see Kaly et al. 2004).
Second, we use the University of Notre-Dame’s Global Adaptation Indicator, nd-gain. The nd-
gain takes into account vulnerability—understood as including the three components of exposure,
sensitivity, and adaptive capacity—as well as readiness, the ‘ability of a country’s private and
public sectors to absorb financial resources and mobilize them efficiently to reduce climate change
vulnerability’ (ND-GAIN 2013: 2). We use the vulnerability sub-index, that is, we exclude
readiness as we want to control for income separately. The vulnerability sub-index score is
composed of 36 indicators and scaled to range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher
levels of vulnerability (see ND-GAIN 2013; nd).
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Finally, as an—admittedly—rough proxy for adaptive capacity, we include gross domestic product
gdp per capita. Adaptive capacity is hard to measure, as it depends on many factors, including
information, education, social cohesion, technology, and resources. We here focus on gdp per
capita since many of the factors such as education or technology tend to correlate with gdp per
capita and since data is readily available. We use annual data from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
To test for recipient merit, that is good (environmental) governance, we include two measures:
the imputed Polity 2 scores from Freedom House on the one hand, and control of corruption from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Although more specific environmental policy indicators
would be a better proxy, there is a lack of data on such policies. Democracies, however, often
have a better environmental track records (e.g. Ba¨ttig and Bernauer 2009), and so we first use
the imputed Polity 2 variable, which measures countries’ level of democracy on a scale from 0
to 10, where 0 is least democratic and 10, most democratic. We prefer this measure over the
original Polity 2 score as it has the widest coverage spatially and temporally.2 Data is annual and
comes from Teorell et al. (2015). We further include a measure of corruption, as lower levels of
corruption are a good indicator for the capacity of countries to make good use of funds provided
by donors. The variable control of corruption is part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(Kaufmann et al. 2014), and is, by design, standardised. Accordingly, the variable ranges from
about -2.5 to +2.5 around a mean of zero with a standard deviation of 1.
We have three commonly used measures to capture donor interests: trade as a measure of eco-
nomic interests; joint voting in the United Nations General Assembly as a measure of political
interests; and colonial past as a measure of historical relations.
First, trade data is taken from the UN Comtrade Database (United Nations Statistics Division
2015). For each of the five years in our dataset (2010 through 2014), we construct a trade network
which captures how much each of the country pairs traded in a given year. For each country
pair, both parties report their exports and imports. Thus, the exports reported by country A
to country B should equal the imports reported by country B from country A. Often, however,
there are discrepancies between these reported data. We therefore decided to use in such cases
the higher value, since underreporting (or not reporting any trade) seems a problem particularly
in smaller and poorer countries. The final network in a given year then consists of the sum of the
thus adjusted import plus export values. This final value is then logged.
Second, Strezhnev and Voeten (2013a) collect data on voting patterns in United Nations General
Assembly roll-call votes. Specifically, they calculate a Voting similarity index (Strezhnev and
Voeten 2013b), which captures how often each country pair agrees when they vote ‘yes’ (approve),
‘no’ (disapprove), or abstain (with abstention also being counted as half-agreements with both
yes and no votes). This count is then standardised to range from zero (no agreement on any
issues) to one (full agreement on all issues).
Finally, the analysis includes a network capturing colonial ties. This network of the same 167
countries as in the aid network simply takes on the value of one if the two countries share a
2The Polity 2 score are not available for small countries with less than 500,000 inhabitants.
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colonial past, that is, if one country has ever been a colony or coloniser of the other country,
otherwise the value is set to zero. There are nine different colonial powers in the dataset, and
113 colonial ties.
Additionally, the analysis includes a memory term, that is whether network ties from previous
periods influence network formation in later years. We also control for a country’s overall gdp




Model 1 Model 2 Model
Indegree −2.56∗ −2.57∗ −2.54∗
[−2.79; −2.13] [−2.81; −2.18] [−2.75; −2.25]
Outdegree −8.48∗ −8.46∗ −8.47∗
[−10.38; −7.18] [−9.60; −7.40] [−9.62; −7.17]
Vulnerab. (ND-GAIN) 0.31∗ 0.37∗
[0.01; 0.64] [0.14; 0.60]
Vulnerab. (EVI) −0.01 −0.03
[−0.11; 0.03] [−0.12; 0.02]
GDP per capita (log) −0.15∗ −0.14∗ −0.14∗
[−0.31; −0.11] [−0.24; −0.04] [−0.22; −0.06]
FH index 0.01∗ 0.02∗
[0.00; 0.04] [0.01; 0.05]
Control of corrupt. −0.02 −0.05
[−0.14; 0.05] [−0.16; 0.01]
Trade ties (matrix) 0.12∗ 0.11∗ 0.12∗
[0.10; 0.14] [0.09; 0.13] [0.10; 0.13]
UN voting (matrix) 0.49 0.52 0.51
[−0.54; 1.70] [−0.59; 1.88] [−0.22; 1.48]
Colon. ties (matrix) 0.79∗ 0.80∗ 0.79∗
[0.35; 1.18] [0.38; 1.13] [0.41; 1.18]
Netw. memory term 1.20∗ 1.21∗ 1.20∗
[1.09; 1.38] [1.04; 1.39] [1.11; 1.37]
Annex 1 dummy −1.25∗ −1.23∗ −1.24∗
[−1.87; −0.42] [−1.82; −0.63] [−1.85; −0.43]
Total GDP (log) 0.04 0.09∗ 0.02
[−0.01; 0.09] [0.02; 0.18] [−0.03; 0.08]
Total GDP sq. −0.00∗ −0.00∗ −0.00
[−0.00; −0.00] [−0.01; −0.00] [−0.00; 0.00]
Observations 103808 103808 103808
∗ significant at 5% confidence level
Table 1: Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models including bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals
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Figure 1: Significant results of full model
In this section we describe the results of the tergms used to model the data. Specifically, the
models use the pseudo-likelihood estimation technique described in (Cranmer and Desmarais
2011; Desmarais and Cranmer 2012; Leifeld et al. 2016), and the confidence intervals are gener-
ated using 1000 bootstrapping iterations. The models we will discuss in this section are shown
in Table 1. The first two models are partial models and include only a single coefficient for vul-
nerability to climate change impact and for the quality of government. Model 3 is a full model
and contains all the variables described in the previous section. Figure 1 depicts the substantive
effects for hypothesis 1 to 3 graphically. 3
Vulnerability: We divide vulnerability to climate change impacts into two parts. One the one
hand, it is a purely naturalistic assessment of how exposed and sensitive to climate change the
various countries in the dataset are (captured by the nd-gain vulnerability sub-index, and the
evi climate sub-index). On the other hand, we also consider the adaptive capacity of countries
as measured by per capita gdp.
The results for the nd-gain vulnerability index show that donor countries seem to consider the
exposure and sensitivity of recipient countries when they decide who gets adaptation aid. The
variable is significant and has the expected positive coefficient in both models which include
this variable (columns 1 and 3 in Table 1). This means that a higher degree of vulnerability
increases the chances of tie formation for recipient countries, and thus of adaptation aid from
developed country governments. More specifically, the coefficient of the variable for the full model
is 0.37. This implies that a change from the lowest possible value of vulnerability to the highest (a
3The effects for the indegree and outdegree coefficients used to test hypotheses 4 and 5 are not shown here,
because the magnitude of these two effects is much larger. They are thus on a very different scale, which makes
plotting them onto the same figure as the other effects difficult, as the confidence intervals of these other effects
become very small.
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difference of about 1 in the dataset) implies an about 45% higher chance of receiving funds from
any of the donor countries.4 This seems like a rather large effect, but it should not be forgotten
that the baseline probability of forming a tie is relatively low.
The effect for the evi climate sub-index, on the other hand, is not significant in the models
reported in Table 1. Even when we do not include the nd-gain variable, higher evi values do
not seem to increase the likelihood of tie formation for developing countries: countries that are
more exposed to climate change as measured by the evi are not more likely to receive adaptation
aid. One reason for this result might be that this index is relatively old (from 2004), and has
only been calculated at a single point in time. Policy makers might no longer take notice of such
an index, whose visibility decreases over the years.
Adaptive capacity, as measured by a country’s per capita gdp, is significant and exhibits a
negative coefficient in all models. Thus, the higher the (logged) per capita gdp, the lower the
probability that developing countries forma tie with donors and receive adaptation aid. The
negative coefficient of -0.14 in the full models means that when the logged gdp per capita value
increases by one point, the likelihood of forming a tie decreases by about 14%. For a change from
the lowest to the highest per capita gdp value among the recipient countries in the dataset, this
translate to an approximately 65% reduced probability of receiving adaptation aid. This might
not seem all that much, but it means that, inversely, the poorest developing countries are about
186% more likely to receive adaptation aid than the richest developing countries in the dataset.
Overall, despite the insignificant findings for the evi climate sub-index, we therefore conclude
that vulnerability matters, as H1 expected: more vulnerable countries are indeed more likely to
receive adaptation aid.
Recipient merits: To measure recipient merit, we employed both the Freedom House Polity 2
variable, and the Control of Corruption variable provided by the Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors. As can be seen in the models in Table 1, the Freedom House index measuring the level of
democracy has a positive and significant effect in both models that include this variable (columns
1 and 3). Yet the effect is relatively small: when the index improves by one point, all else equal,
the models predict the likelihood to receive adaptation aid to increase only by about 2%. There-
fore, the maximum effect that this variable can have is an increase in the chance of receiving aid
by approximately 25%, when the Freedom Index changes from the lowest to the highest value, all
else equal. Democratic performance consequently plays a role, but it seems to be less important
than vulnerability to climate change impacts (both climate sensitivity and adaptive capacity) for
the aid allocation decisions of donors.
Control of corruption, on the other hand, does not significantly influence how donor countries
distribute adaptation aid. The coefficient for this variable remains insignificant even when we
exclude the other meausre of recipient merit, that is, level of democracy (column 2 in Table 1). It
is unclear why control of corruption does not seem to affect whether a country receives adaptation
aid. To conclude, then, we find only limited evidence in favour of our expectation that donors
4To obtain this result, we calculate (exp(0.37)− 1) ∗ 100 = 44.77. In the first step, the log-odds are transformed
into the odds ratio, from which then the percentage can be calculated.
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use adaptation aid to reward good governance (H2). The evidence is relatively weak and the
predicted effect, according to the models, relatively small.
Donor interests: To what degree do donor interests play a role for adaptation aid allocation?
We measure donor interest using three variables: trade relations, UN voting patterns, and colonial
ties. While the other independent variables used so far for hypotheses testing are monadic, that
is, only the characteristics of the recipient countries play a role (how vulnerable are they, how
democratic are they, etc.), these donor interest variables are dyadic by definition. In other words,
the characteristic of the donor itself plays a role for aid allocation decisions. For tergms such
variables are themselves constructed as networks (using the same countries as the nodes), with
the edges of the networks registering the value of the independent variable in question, i.e. the
trade volume between country A and B, or whether colonial ties between the two exist, or the
similarity in their voting patterns in the un General Assembly. These annual (in the case of the
trade and un voting data) or single networks (colonial ties) can then be included as independent
variables in the tergms, with positive coefficients denoting that an increase in the variable in
question improves the odds of tie formation, and decreases the chances of forming a tie when the
effect is negative.
The annual trade networks exhibit a strong positive coefficient, indicating that a more intensive
trade relationship between two countries greatly improves the chance of tie formation, and thus
of recipient countries receiving adaptation aid from their trading partners. When the (logged)
bilateral trade balance between a donor and a recipient increases by one unit, the predicted
probability of forming a tie increases by approximately 12%. This is not an indication that
larger countries, with which donors tend to trade more extensively, simply get more aid, since
we control for total gdp in the models. It might well be that tie formation with larger countries
is more likely (although the models are rather inconclusive on that issue), yet keeping total gdp
constant, the models predict that the trade balance (strongly) influences whether developing
countries receive adaptation aid, or whether they are overlooked. For instance, if the (logged)
dyadic trade variable between two countries increases by 15 units, the models predict the odds of
tie formation to increase be more than 450%. Again, we have to keep in mind that the baseline
probability of tie formation in the aid networks is very low, only about 2.5%. Thus, even a strong
growth in trade between two countries (starting at zero trade) would increase this probability of
tie formation only to about 11.6%. Still, this is by far the strongest effect for all the independent
variables in the models.
The UN voting networks, on the other hand, are not significant. Although they exhibit a relatively
large positive effect, as expected, the coefficient has a very wide confidence interval. Thus, similar
interests in international relations do not seem to translate into tie formation: recipient countries
that vote in line with a donor are not more likely to receive adaptation aid from that donor.
Finally, the strong positive effect of the colonial ties network indicated that recipient countries
do receive preferential treatment by their former colonial powers. All else equal, the models pre-
dict that former colonies are about 120% more likely to receive adaptation aid than developing
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countries without colonial ties. Thus, combining the colonial effect with the findings for the trade
networks, this paper corroborates the findings of the general aid literature that donor interests
are the strongest predictor for aid allocation, although donor needs (vulnerability) and donor
merits (democracy) also play a role for these allocation decisions.
Donor coordination: Finally, we also test our expectations that a recipients’ in-degree influ-
ences the likelihood of other donors giving to that country (H4 and H5). In other words, here
we test whether a developing countries’ nodal degree, i.e. the number of already existing links
to donors, increases or decreases the odds of other donors also providing adaptation aid to that
recipient country. Thus, we test if there is some form of donor coordination in the aid network,
or whether the donors make their decision to form ties with recipient countries independent of
each other. A positive effect would indicate that donors ‘follow’ where other donors are going, i.e.
that they give aid to the same recipients (H5). In contrast, a negative effect is an indication that
donors divide the field of recipient countries up among them, and focus more on these few coun-
tries. Thus, when a country receives aid but some donors, the likelihood of forming additional
ties decreases (H4).
The negative in-degree coefficient is evidence in favour of H4: donors seem to focus their adap-
tation aid on a certain subset of countries, mostly countries in which not too many other donor
countries are active. Indeed, according to the models, with every formed tie the likelihood of
other donors giving to that particular recipient country decreases dramatically, as the coefficient
is quite substantial (-2.54). In addition, the negative out-degree effect indicates that the odds
of donor countries giving aid to additional recipients decrease the more ties they have already
formed. Overall, this is clear evidence in favour of H4, that is, donor coordination, while H5 must
be rejected.
5 Model fit
In this section, we briefly evaluate how well the models (particularly Model 3) fit the data. First of
all, we check for model degeneracy by simulating 1,000 networks from the model. These networks
are then compared to the observed networks at each observed time step. If the global statistics
of the simulated networks are very different from those of the observed networks, that is, if the
hypotheses that these statistics are the same are refuted (small p-values), this indicates model
degeneracy. For our Model 3, not a single of the simulated statistics is significantly different
than the corresponding statistic of the observed networks. The lowest p-value is 0.29 for the
in-degree coefficient of the last time period. Almost all other coefficients across all time periods
have p-values of about 0.5 or larger. Thus, none of our simulated coefficients is even close to a
level where we observe large differences between the simulated and the observed networks. We
therefore conclude that degeneracy is not a problem in our models.
Figure 2 shows the goodness of fit for Model 3 graphically. The solid black line shows the value of
a certain statistic (at specifies values) for the observed networks, while the grey boxplots show the
12












































































Figure 2: Goodness of fit for Model 3
predictions for the same statistic for the 1,000 simulations. We can clearly see that the predictions
for the four selected network characteristics closely follow those of the observed networks, which
is another indicator for the high goodness of fit of the model.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the precision-recall curve (pr) and the receiver–operating characteristics.
The precision rate is an indication of the number of ties predicted for the various years that
are indeed observed in the original networks. The dark blue lines show the pr curves for the
annual networks, while the lighter blue lines show the curves for randomly chosen networks with
the same number of ties. The further to the upper-right corner the pr curves point, the higher
the precision. Clearly, the models reported in this paper have a high precision and are thus
able to capture the characteristics of the original networks well. Similarly, the receiver–operating
characteristics curves compare the true positives to the false positives, i.e. how often the model
predicts a tie correctly, and how often the prediction of tie formation is false. Again, the curve
indicates that the instances of false positives is low, and the model is well suited for capturing
the characteristics of the original aid networks. Overall, we therefore conclude that the models


















































Figure 3: Precision-recall curve and receiver-operating characteristics for Model 3
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the question how bilateral aid for adaptation to climate change is
distributed. We first focused on the ‘traditional’ determinants of aid allocation: recipient need,
recipient merit and donor interests. We understand recipient need as vulnerability to climate
change in the adaptation context and used three measures: the nd-gain vulnerability indicator,
the evi climate sub-index and gdp per capita. We measured recipient merit as democratic
status and control of corruption, and recipient interests as trade relations, un voting patterns
and colonial ties. In addition, we examined donor interaction: to what extent and how donors
take into account the allocation decision of other donors when providing adaptation aid.
To answer the research questions, we employ Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models
(tergms). Our dependent variable consists of five adaptation aid networks for the years 2010
through 2014. These networks capture whether a particular donor country provides adaptation
aid to a developing country in a given year. The entries in the network matrices take on the
value of one when a tie exists, and zero otherwise. Such a data structure could be modelled
using traditional panel data methods. However, ¶textsctergms are particularly useful to capture
network effects such as tie formation based on the allocation decisions made by others. In addition,
the temporal dimension, i.e. how allocation decisions in past years influence adaptation aid
distribution in later periods, can be modelled in the tergms used in this paper. We demonstrate
that these models are clearly able to capture the particular structure of the underlying data.
Our results show that recipient need, recipient merit and also donor interests all play a role for aid
allocation decisions of developed countries. However, we also see that these determinants clearly
differ in their importance when donor countries decide on how to allocate adaptation aid. The
most important determinant of adaptation aid allocation, according to our models and in line
with previous research, is donor interest. Particularly trade relations and colonial ties both have a
strong positive effect, and the size of the coefficients of these two variables show that they greatly
influence the probability that a given recipient country receives aid from the donor in question.
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Recipient needs, measured by vulnerability to climate change impacts on the one hand, and by
adaptive capacity (measured as gdp per capita) on the other hand, also significantly influences
the decision making process, although the magnitude of these effects is considerably smaller than
of those for donor interests. Finally, recipient merit, particularly democratic status, also play a
significant role when developed countries decide how to allocate adaptation aid. However, the
magnitude of this donor merits effect pales in comparison to the other two.
Finally, we were also able to show that donors do not make their allocation decisions independently
from each other, but that they consider how others distribute their aid. More specifically, when
recipients already receive aid from a host of other donors, the likelihood that a donor country
will also form ties with recipients decreases quite dramatically. This means that donors try to
focus on a certain set of recipient countries, which is also shown by the high stability of the aid
networks across time (the memory term is positive and highly significant).
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